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## OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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


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**CONFIDENTIAL**

3. SOVIET OFFICIAL SAYS NEW BERLIN TRAVEL  
CONTROLS NOT SUBJECT FOR NEGOTIATION

25X1 [REDACTED] The Soviet acting commandant in Berlin, Colonel Kotsiuba, told Allied political advisers on 22 November that, although Soviet authorities were not challenging

25X1 [REDACTED] Allied communication to Berlin per se, control procedures on rail travel were entirely a matter for the Soviets to decide, and they had a right to change them as they wished. Colonel Kotsiuba emphasized that the purpose of the stricter controls was to limit travel to members of the Allied military garrisons in Berlin and their dependents, and that this limit would apply to both rail and autobahn traffic. He claimed that persons unconnected with the Berlin military garrisons have been traveling on military trains or under military orders on the autobahn.

Kotsiuba expressed satisfaction with the American and French willingness to provide Soviet authorities with individual travel orders and Russian translations. The British authorities have now decided to follow this practice also. The Allied officials rejected Soviet demands for permission to board trains to inspect passengers' documents and decide whether individuals had a right to such documentation. Kotsiuba was not entirely clear about what criteria should be used for determining what individuals had a right to travel documentation.

Comment


Soviet authorities started demanding more detailed documentation for rail travel on the night of 20-21 November. Kotsiuba's statement is the first indication that the Soviets might seek to prevent individuals under Allied military orders from traveling to Berlin on the autobahn as well as by rail. The USSR may hope to force more Allied nationals, if no longer covered by travel orders, to apply for East German visas for travel to Berlin.

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#### 4. PRAVDA EDITORIAL JUSTIFIES POSITION AGAINST TITO

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A Pravda editorial of 23 November strongly denies Tito's charges that Stalinist principles continue in Moscow. Pravda attempts at great length to prove that Soviet relations with other socialist states are being conducted on a basis of absolute equality. It accuses Tito of disrupting socialist international unity and trying to interfere in other parties, particularly the Albanian and French. However, it calls for a clarification of controversial problems in "a comradelike exchange of views." Moscow is obviously trying to keep the present dispute from erupting into an absolute split.

Pravda calls Tito's independent road a poor example, since Yugoslavia has had to rely on extensive economic aid from the "imperialists." It concedes that the Yugoslav workers' councils have "some positive elements," but criticizes Yugoslavia's decentralization of economic planning and failure to socialize agriculture, specifically calling attention to its chronic grain shortages. Pravda boasts that the Chinese Communists have made a "huge contribution" to the construction of a socialist society without trying to impose their ideas on others.

In an absolute denial of Tito's charge that Soviet-imposed Stalinist policies had caused the Hungarian problem, the editorial claims that the excesses of the earlier period in Hungary were the result of too slavish imitation of Soviet methods by Rakosi and Gero, against the advice given by the Soviet leaders themselves.

The Soviet Union has now put the next move up to the Yugoslavs. On 20 November Yugoslav acting

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foreign secretary Prica told Ambassador Riddleberger that he felt the Soviet leaders did not want to break completely. However, the Yugoslavs apparently feel that it is time to indicate to Moscow by such gestures as their latest initiative to revitalize the Balkan pact that they are maintaining their relations with the West.

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5. GOMULKA REPORTEDLY PLANS MAJOR CHANGE IN  
POLISH COMMUNIST PARTY

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[REDACTED] Polish party first secretary Wladyslaw  
Gomulka greatly distrusts the pre-World  
War II members of the Polish Communist  
Party, now in positions of authority, [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] He is promoting former so-  
cialists, Spanish Civil War veterans, and members of the  
wartime Communist underground army. He also is reported  
to be placing great emphasis on a revival of the Peasant  
Party, and intends it to play a role in the new government,  
which will eventually become similar to a Western socialist  
democracy. Gomulka's attitude toward the Communist Party  
is very hostile, [REDACTED] who believes that  
the party is being destroyed. (NOFORN)

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Comment

Gomulka has already made one Peasant  
Party leader a deputy premier and has  
named nonparty men to lead the ministries of health and ship-  
ping. There is no indication, however, that he plans to change  
the Communist Party to the extent necessary to make Poland  
a socialist democracy. He probably does intend to broaden  
the composition of the party and strengthen his control by ad-  
vancing people who are in sympathy with his ideas.

The pre-World War II Communists Gomulka  
reportedly distrusts are those who spent the war years in the  
USSR and have generally been strongly pro-Soviet.

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


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## 6. POLISH PAPER ATTACKS SOVIET ACTIONS IN HUNGARY

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 The Polish newspaper Zycie Warszawy on 23 November rejected as "nonsensical" Soviet charges that the Hungarian revolution was started by Western agents and American dollars. It called this version "too churlish and primitive to deserve argument" and criticized "Russian comrades" for a "zigzagging lack of consistency and return to Stalinist methods."

The paper compared the Hungarian revolution with the Poznan uprising, and said the "heroic" Hungarians were fighting for the same thing as the Poles--sovereignty.

### Comment

Zycie Warszawy has been in the forefront of the campaign for democratization and national independence, and it is probable that the extreme nature of this criticism was not approved by the regime. Although Polish leaders have been unhappy over Soviet actions in Hungary, they have attempted to avoid antagonizing the USSR by criticizing it openly. The Polish abstention on the Asian-sponsored United Nations resolution on Hungary and the vagueness of the section of the Soviet-Polish communiqué on 18 November which dealt with Hungary, however, may indicate that the regime intends to follow a semi-independent foreign policy. (CONFIDENTIAL)

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
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## 9. CHOU EN-LAI'S ARRIVAL IN CAMBODIA

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The "hero's welcome" accorded Chou En-lai on his arrival in neutralist Cambodia on 22 November was a major Chinese Communist propaganda victory made possible by the all-out efforts of the Cambodian government. Chou was greeted by Prince Sihanouk, "a red carpet several hundred yards long," thousands of school children, and large numbers of Overseas Chinese waving Chinese Communist flags.

The embassy comments that Sihanouk, apparently for prestige reasons, wished to give Chou a reception up to Communist standards of regimented enthusiasm. The Cambodian chief of staff personally supervised security arrangements at the Phnom Penh airfield. The Cambodians were particularly anxious to forestall demonstrations by Nationalist-oriented Chinese, and prominent Chinese Nationalists had been placed under house detention.

Chou's reception, which was in marked contrast to the perfunctory attention given the visit of Chinese Nationalist foreign minister George Yeh last June, will probably accelerate the drift of Cambodia's Chinese community to allegiance to Peiping.

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